



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC 20350

Ser 009P3/366863
14 July 1983

NSA review
completed

MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, INTERAGENCY GROUP/
COUNTERMEASURES

Subj: Cryptographic Access Requirements

Ref: (a) D/ICS-83-0689 of 13 June 1983

1. In reply to reference (a), the Department of the Navy comments on the NSA IG/CM initiative concerning a proposed cryptographic access program are as follows:

a. Navy believes that the resource impact of a cryptographic access program may easily negate the benefits of such a program. Therefore, I do not agree with NSA on the need for a cryptographic access program, especially the requirement for military personnel to possess final security clearance and consent to aperiodic counterespionage polygraph examination as a precondition of assignment to duty involving access to cryptographic material. Some primary concerns are:

The NSDD's broad-brush approach (e.g., rules appear the same for CONFIDENTIAL tactical material as for TOP SECRET strategic material).

- Impact on Naval forces afloat and ashore. With thousands of personnel handling cryptographic materials (e.g., nearly 2000 Navy and Marine Corps COMSEC custodians/alternates alone), this directive would precipitate a major administrative burden.

- Manpower, equipment, and other costs associated with polygraph examination.

- Operational manning problems when military personnel evade cryptographic-related assignments by legally exercising their rights to refuse polygraph examination.

- Potential problems in a contractor environment (e.g., contractors may elect to forego military contracts because of polygraph requirements).

- Pre-publication review requirements presuppose a ready availability of resources to conduct timely reviews. Substantial increases in resources would be required for this review process unless such requirements were more narrow in scope.

b. In view of the above, request any action to establish a cryptographic access program be addressed fully at the National COMSEC Committee (NCSC) level before further consideration is given to an NSDD on this subject. The NCSC can examine alternate approaches to the access problem, including technical solutions which have less impact on resources.

ATTACHMENT 4

NAVY review(s)
completed.

D. H. McDowell
RADM USN
Navy Member IG/CM